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Abstract. The article deals with the application rationae personae of the right to self-
determination. Relying on the existing international legal framework, decisions of the judicial 
bodies and doctrine, the author analyses conceivable beneficiaries of the above-mentioned 
right: the inhabitants of Trust and Non-Self-Governing territories, peoples under foreign 
occupation, the entire population of a state and subgroups within a state.
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Introduction
The origin of the principle of self-determination can be traced back to the american 
declaration of Independence (1776) and the French revolution (1789), which challenged 
the statement of the King Louis XIV of France and other absolute monarchs – “L‘etat 
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c‘est moi” (I am the State)1. Since then the principle took a long way of evolution2, and 
now it plays a special role among the fundamental principles of public international law 
enshrined in article 2 of the united Nations charter and particularised in the Friendly 
relations declaration3. It is argued that even the principle prohibiting threat or use of 
threat may be overridden by the “sacred right to self-determination”4. The right to self-
determination is also reflected in other international documents, such as the Declaration 
on Granting Independence to colonial countries and peoples5, resolution (XV)6 of the 
General assembly of the united Nations, the united Nations covenant on civil and 
political rights (1966), as well as the united Nations covenant on economic, Social 
and cultural rights (hereinafter both documents are referred to as the ‘Human rights 
covenants’) (1966), the Final act of the conference on Security and co-Operation in 
europe (1975), the Vienna declaration and the programme of action (1993). all the 
documents refer to “peoples” as the holders of the right to self-determination. 
While there is no dispute on the importance and existence of the right to self-
determination7, there are some aspects that remain unclear and even controversial. This 
article focuses on the controversial aspect of self-determination regarding its scope of 
application rationae personae8. The application rationae personae can be determined 
only insofar as the term “peoples” has been defined. The crux of the problem is the 
absence of the definition of the term “peoples” within the framework of international 
law. Despite such absence of the definition, the states’ practise and jurisprudence have 
revealed some entities that might be considered as “peoples”. Firstly, the term “peoples” 
refers to the inhabitants of Trust and Non-Self-Governing territories9. Some assert that 
1  Žilinskas, J. Kosovo mazgas [The knot of Kosovo]. [interactive]. 2008-05-02 [accessed on 2012-05-18]. 
< http://vz.lt/straipsnis/2008/05/02/Kosovo_mazgas?readcomment=1>. 
2 See more about the evolution of self-determination, for instance, Sureda, r. The Evolution of the Right of 
Self-Determination: A Study of United Nations Practise. Leiden: Sijthoff, 1973.
3 declaration on principles of International Law concerning Friendly relations and cooperation among 
States in accordance with the charter of the united Nations, uN doc. a/res/2625 (XXV) of 24 Oct. 1970. 
4 pomerance, M. Self-determination Today: the Metamorphosis of an Ideal. Israel Law Review. 1984, 19 
(3-4): 310-339. 
5 declaration on Granting Independence to colonial countries and peoples, uN doc. a/res/1514 (XV) of 
14 dec. 1960.
6 principles which should guide Members in determining whether or not an obligation exists to transmit the 
information called for under article 73e of the charter, uN doc. a/res/1541 (XV) of 15 dec. 1960.
7 after the adoption of the united Nations charter in 1945, the principle of self-determination is referred as 
a right. See, for instance, Raič, D. Statehood and the Law of Self-Determination. Leiden, Boston: Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, 2002, p. 200; Musgrave, T. D. Self-Determination and National Minorities. Oxford: 
clarendon press, 1997, p. 62.
8 The other controversial aspect relates to the principle’s application rationae materiae, i. e. whether the 
right to self-determination includes the right to independent statehood, particularly in the situations where 
no consent of a parent state is given. In this respect, the issue of self-determination involves a wide range 
of claims by people who seek to establish sovereign states or to achieve the recognition for a certain part 
of the territory, as in the case of Kosovo, chechnya, Kashmir, South Ossetia, abkhazia, etc. However, the 
detailed discussion of the international legal position of secession is beyond the scope of this article, thus 
only some of the relevant observations will be made. 
9 See more in Quane, H. The united Nations and the evolving right to Self-determination. The International 
and Comparative Law Quarterly. 1998, 47 (3): 537-572.
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the right to self-determination pertains merely to colonial people, although the analysis 
of the relevant international documents denies this perception10. Secondly, people that 
are organised as states can be regarded as beneficiaries of self-determination11. 
The application of self-determination to the above-mentioned entities may invoke 
discussions among academics12, although it does not entail significant difficulties in 
practise. On the contrary, there is no consensus whether distinct subgroups (groups) 
within independent states may be qualified as “peoples” for the purpose of self-
determination. even if so, there are ambiguities with regard to the characteristics of 
such subgroups. except for the african commission on Human and peoples’ rights13, 
international courts or bodies tried to avoid clarification on the features attributable 
to a subgroup14. In this regard, the ironical approach of I. jennings seems to be quite 
relevant as he stated that “[o]n the surface it seem[s] reasonable: let the people decide. 
It [is] in fact ridiculous because the people cannot decide until somebody decides who 
are the people”15.
The inability to determine all aspects of the term “peoples” “<...> means that the 
appropriate circumstances in which to apply the right of self-determination often remain 
in doubt”16. It implies that the right of self-determination may become an inoperative 
legal norm or dependent upon political considerations. The subjects of the right may not 
be able to invoke it, as well as states to assure it, what entails international responsibility 
of the state. Thus it is of great importance to analyse the scope of application rationae 
personae in order to know the groups that may legitimately exercise the right to self-
determination.
One may argue that there can be no absolutely clear criteria and that the existence 
of “peoples” depends on the circumstances of each individual case17. To some extent, 
10 See chapter 1 of this article.
11 See chapter 2 of this article.
12 See chapters 1 and 2 of this article.
13 Kevin Mgwanga Gunme et al  v. Cameroon, 266/03, of  27 May 2009.
14 For instance, the Supreme court of canada stated “as the right to self-determination has developed by 
virtue of a combination of international agreements and conventions, coupled with state practice, with 
little formal elaboration of the definition of ‘peoples’, the result has been that the precise meaning of the 
term ‘people’ remains somewhat uncertain.” Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] S.c.r, § 281.
15 I. jennings also reminds the professor of political Science “<...> who was also president of the united 
States, president Wilson, enunciated a doctrine which was ridiculous, but which was widely accepted as 
a sensible proposition, the doctrine of self-determination. On the surface it seemed reasonable: let the 
people decide. It was in fact ridiculous because the people cannot decide until somebody decides who 
are the people.” see in jennings, I. The Approach to Self-Government. cambridge university press, 1956, 
p. 55-56.
16 Musgrave, T. d., supra note 7, p. 148.
17 For instance, aureliu cristescu, the Special rapporteur of the Sub-commission on prevention of 
discrimination and protection of Minorities stated: “<…> whenever in the course of history a people 
has become aware of being people, all definitions have proved superfluous”. As quoted in Duursma, J. 
Self-Determination, Statehood and International Relations of Micro States. The Cases of Liechtenstein, 
San Marino, Monaco, Andorra and the Vatican City. Groningen (Netherlands): Drukkerij van Denderen, 
1994, p. 41. elizabeth chadwick upholds the similar position and maintains that “<…> the right of 
self-determination allows states to agree mutually that “all peoples” are so entitled, whilst the concrete 
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the author agrees with this view. The above-mentioned right is inextricably related with 
politics, and its application may depend on particular circumstances, though it does not 
mean that the application of self-determination rationae personae cannot be analysed 
from the perspective of international public law. A contrario, if “<…> international 
law wants to maintain its credibility and its role as a stabilizer of international relations, 
it needs to adapt itself to these recent developments, without, however, abandoning 
its normative aspirations”18. In other words, the analyses of individual cases help 
evaluating whether a certain case can be regarded as a political solution or may 
contribute to the development of international norms. any analysis based merely on 
individual circumstances would not be legally relevant unless it is conducted within the 
legal international framework. 
The research on self-determination, including its application rationae personae, 
does not lack the attention of foreign scholars. However, most of the researchers, with 
few exceptions19, while trying to define the beneficiaries of self-determination, do not 
clearly emphasise or distinguish different modes of implementing self-determination: 
internal and external20. In the author’s view, this makes the definition of “peoples” 
confusing and unclear. Yet, some of the scientists analysing the notion “peoples” base 
their research on the presumption that self-determination involves or might involve 
secession21. as a result, the category on occasion has been limited and the term 
“peoples” has on occasion been “stripped of its ordinary meaning and reconstructed as 
something quite different”22. It might be the reason why “peoples” are still the subject 
application of self-determination can be left to domestic state arrangements, and, of course, “events”, such 
as the outbreak of non-international armed conflicts” see Chadwick E. Post-World War 2 Exercises of 
Self-determination: “peaceful”, “Friendly”, and “Other” in Summers, j. (ed.) Kosovo: A Precedent? The 
Netherlands: 329. Martinus Nijhoff, 2011, p. 329.
18 ryngaert, c.; Sobrie S. recognition of States: International Law or realpolitik? The practice of 
recognition in the Wake of Kosovo, South Ossetia, and abkhazia. Leiden Journal of International Law. 
24 (2): 467-490, 2011, p. 468.
19 See Raič, D., supra note 7 p. 243-272; crawford, j. The right of Self-determination in International Law: 
Its development and Future in alston, p. (ed).  People’s Rights. Oxford: Oxford university press, 2001.
20 See, for instance, pomerance, M., supra note 4, p. 320-327; Gunter, L.; Smis, S. New dimensions of 
the right to self-determination: a study of the international response to the Kosovo crisis. Nationalism 
and Ethnic Politics. 2000, 6 (2): 43-70; Ghebrewebet, H. Identifying units of statehood and determining 
international boundaries. Frankfurt am Main: Lang, 2006, p. 117-125; Koeck, H. F.; Horn, d.; 
Leidenmuehler F. From Protectorate to Statehood Self-Determination v. Territorial Integrity in the Case 
of Kosovo And the Position of the European Union. Vienna: Graz, 2009, p. 97-99; Wilson, G. Self-
determination, recognition and the problem of Kosovo. Netherlands International Law Review. 2009, 
LVI: 455-481, p. 470-471; Brown, S. B. Human rights, Sovereignty, and the Final Status of Kosovo. 
Chicago-Kent Law Review. 2005, 80 (235): 235-272; Musgrave, T., supra note 7..
21 Quane, H. a right to Self-determination for the Kosovo albanians? Leiden Journal of International Law. 
2000, 13: 219-227, although see a rather different view in Quane, H. Self-determination and Minority 
protection after Kosovo in Summers, j.  Kosovo: A Precedent? The Netherlands: 329. Martinus Nijhoff, 
2011, p. 181-212; castellino, j. International Law and Self-Determination: the Interplay of the Politics 
of Territorial Possession with Formulations of Post-Colonial National Identity. cambridge: Kluwer law 
international, 2000, p. 46-73; Tomuschat, c. Self-determination in a post-colonial World in Tomuschat, 
c. (ed.). Modern Law of Self-Determination. Netherlands: Kluwer academic publishers, 1993, p. 1-20. 
22 As quoted in Raič, d., supra note 7, p. 243. 
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of uncertainty. Moreover, the research on the application rationae personae cannot be 
considered as comprehensive, because usually it constitutes merely a small part of the 
broad analysis on self-determination issues. Thus, in the author’s view, there is quite a 
lot of room for research in this field. 
Therefore, the article focuses on “peoples” as the beneficiaries of the right to 
self-determination, specifically on the inhabitants of Trust and Non-Self-Governing 
territories, people organised as states and subgroups within independent states. a special 
emphasis will be drawn on the latter category, whereas the first two are applicable in 
practise without any significant difficulties. Pursuant to the scope of the research, the 
right to self-determination is understood as having two modes of implementation, i.e. 
internal and external23.
1. The Inhabitants of Trust and Non-Self-Governing Territories 
as “Peoples”
after the adoption of the united Nations charter, the concept of self-determination 
developed mainly in the context of decolonization due to the General assembly 
resolutions and “the increase in afro-asian membership in the 1960’s”24. Self-
determination has played a pivotal role as “a catalyst of decolonization”25, and it is 
undoubtedly considered that the inhabitants of Trust and Non-Self-Governing territories 
are beneficiaries of self-determination26. In other words, self-determination “<...> 
belongs to the people as the whole: if the population of a colonial territory is divided 
up into various ethnic groups or nations, they are not at liberty to choose by themselves 
their external status”27. The entire population of a colony is regarded as a “people” “in 
a strict legal sense and for legal purposes only”28. 
In terms of colonialism, peoples were confined to a free choice of the territory’s 
external political status29. This mode of self-determination “<...> is often referred to 
23 The right of secession can be exercised under the existing constitutional right to secede or where the 
subsequent approval has been obtained by the former sovereign. unilateral secession is the secession 
without the consent of the former sovereign. For instance, Kosovo secession from Serbia is regarded as 
the unilateral one.
24 Higgins, r. Self-determination and Secession in dahlitz, j. (ed). Secession and International Law. Conflict 
Avoidance – Regional Appraisals. The Hague: T.M.c. asser press, 2003, p. 23.
25 jaber, T. a case of Kosovo? Self-determination and secession in the XXI century. The International 
Journal of Human Rights. 2011, 15 (6): 926-947, p. 928.
26 although this conclusion is uncontroversial, see more in Quane, H., supra note 9. 
27 cassese, a., Self-determination of peoples: a legal reappraisal.  New York: cambridge university press, 
1995, p. 72. It should be pointed out that the exceptions were made. For instance, in the case of the non-
self-governing territory of the Gilbert and ellice Island, the General assembly approved the partition of 
the territory as the result of the wishes of the inhabitants of the ellice Islands, which became the state of 
Tuvalu. See uN doc. a/res/32/407, 28 Nov. 1977.
28 Raič, D., supra note 7, p. 143.
29 The General assembly resolution 1541 maintains the obligation of the states to report continuously until 
„a territory and its peoples attain a full measure of self-government”. Self-government encompasses: 
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as external self-determination, because it generally denotes the determination of the 
international status of a territory and a people, as opposed to internal self-determination, 
which generally refers to the relationship between the government of a State and the 
people of that State”30. The complete disregard of internal dimension might be the 
reason why self-determination is still quite often equated with the right to statehood. 
after the adoption of the General assembly resolutions concerning decolonization, 
the principle of self-determination was elaborated in other international instruments. In 
1966, Article 1 (1) of the Human Rights Covenants confirmed that “all peoples have the 
right of self-determination”. In both documents the key idea of self-determination was 
expressed that peoples “[b]y virtue of that right <...> freely determine their political 
status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development” (article 
1 (1). Furthermore, it is emphasised that the State parties to the covenants “<...> 
including those having responsibility for the administration of Non-Self-Governing 
and Trust Territories, shall promote the realization of the right of self-determination, 
and shall respect that right, in conformity with the provisions of the charter of the 
united Nations” (article 1 (3). International treaties lay down the obligation regarding 
self-determination to all states, not merely those administering Non-Self-Governing 
and Trust Territories. Therefore, self-determination is considered as a human right and 
extends beyond the context of decolonization.  
despite the fact that self-determination was envisaged as a human right applicable 
to “all peoples”, one asserts that self-determination was “<...> relevant only to 
colonialism and was specifically applied in the promotion of the independence of 
peoples under colonial domination”31. The author of this article favours the approach in 
which the beneficiaries of self-determination are not confined to colonial people. 
Firstly, the principle was enshrined in the universal multilateral treaty – the united 
Nations Charter – without limiting its applicability to specific situations. Secondly, 
the provisions of both Human rights covenants also clearly refer to “all peoples” and 
not merely to colonial peoples. This conclusion is supported by the wording of the 
article 1 (3) of both international treaties as it refers to “[t]he States parties to the 
present covenant including those having responsibility for the administration of Non-
(a) emergence as a sovereign independent State; (b) Free association with an independent State; or 
(c) Integration with an independent State (principle VI). The Friendly relations declaration reiterates 
these forms and states: “The establishment of a sovereign and independent State, the free association or 
integration with an independent State or emergence into any other political status freely determined by a 
people constitute modes of implementing the right of self-determination by that people.”
30 Raič, d., supra note 7, p. 205. On the modes or forms of self-determination see also, for instance, cassese, 
a., op. cit., p. 71-140; rosas, a. Internal Self-determination in Tomuschat, c., supra note 21, p. 225-253; 
alfredsson, G. The right of Self-determination and Indigenous peoples in Tomuschat, c., supra note 21, 
p. 41-55. In this article see chapter 3.
31 For instance, during the debates on the adoption of the General assembly resolution 2625 (XXV) in 1970, 
the representative of Burma stated: “[t]he sum total of the experience gained by the united Nations in the 
implementation of the principle [of self-determination] had clearly and incontrovertibly established its 
meaning and its purpose, namely that it was relevant only to colonialism and was specifically applied in 
the promotion of the independence of peoples under colonial domination.” As quoted in Raič, d., supra 
note 7, p. 226.
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Self-Governing and Trust Territories”32. If it had been applicable merely to colonies, it 
would not have contained two separate references to all states parties and to those states 
that were responsible for the administration of colonial territories. 
Furthermore, the perception that the beneficiaries of self-determination are not 
limited to the inhabitants of Trust and Non-Self-Governing territories is also rebutted 
by the Friendly relations declaration33. It states that:
“[n]othing in the foregoing paragraphs shall be construed as authorising or 
encouraging any action which would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the 
territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent States conducting 
themselves in compliance with the principle of equal rights and self-determination as 
described above and thus possessed of a government representing the whole people 
belonging to the territory without distinction as to race, creed or colour.”34 
The inclusion of the paragraph cited above would be unnecessary “[i]f self-
determination would have been intended to apply to colonial situations only”35. The 
wording of the paragraph implies that, as in article 1 (3) of the Human rights covenants, 
all states have to conduct themselves in compliance with the right to self-determination. 
Moreover, states “<...> must also respect this right in regard to their own peoples”36. In 
addition, the General assembly of the united Nations does not limit the use of the term 
“peoples” to colonial situations. It has recognised the right to self-determination for 
many situations outside the context of decolonization, including “palestinian people”37, 
“Tibetan people”38, or “the people of South africa”39.
The above-mentioned position is supported by professor j. crawford who points 
out that the right to self-determination as applicable only to colonial situations cannot 
be interpreted “just as a matter of ordinary treaty interpretation”40. Yet, it should be 
noted that the application of the principle mostly to colonial situations does not mean 
that its application is restricted from the legal point of view. A fortiori the right of 
self-determination was applicable in the restoration of Lithuania’s independence41, as 
32 emphasis added.
33 according to professor V. Vadapalas, although the General assembly declarations do not have a legally 
binding power, the latter declaration is considered to be obligatory as it meets certain conditions. The 
Resolution confirms the existing norms and principles of international law. Moreover, it formulates the 
rights and obligations. Finally, the resolution was adopted unanimously without vote. It implies that the 
international community “as the whole” expressed its opinion juris with regard to the norms included 
in the document. See in Vadapalas, V. Tarptautinė teisė [International Law]. Vilnius: eugrimas, 2006, 
p. 126.
34 emphasis added.
35 Raič, d., supra note 7, p. 231.
36 Ibid.
37 See, for instance, uN doc. a/res/64/438 of  dec. 19, 2009; uN doc. a/res/65/202 of  dec 21, 2010.
38 See, for instance, uN doc a/res/1723 of dec. 20, 1961.
39 See, for instance, uN doc. a/res/41/35 of  Nov. 1986.
40 crawford, j., supra note 19, p. 27.
41 See more on the applicability of the principle of self-determination in Lithuania‘s case in Žalimas, D. 
Lietuvos Respublikos nepriklausomybės atkūrimas. Pagrindiniai klausimai pagal tarptautinę teisę. 
[restoration of the independence of the republic of Lithuania. The main questions under international 
law] Vilnius: rosma, 1997.
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well as of the other Baltic states, although it does not imply that the right is applicable 
only to territories which are illegally annexed and are under foreign occupation. Thus, 
there are two different aspects which cannot be equated. They were well illustrated 
by M. Kreca, the judge ad hoc of the International court of justice. He observed that 
“[t]he fact that in the court’s practice <...> the right to <...> self-determination has 
been linked to non-self government territories cannot be interpreted as a limitation of 
the scope of the right to self-determination ratione personae, but as an application of 
universal law ad casum”42. 
as noted above, self-determination is understood as one of the legal grounds to 
restore independence. In other words, the population which is under foreign occupation 
or illegally annexed may also be considered as the beneficiaries of the right to self-
determination. The idea that entitlement to self-determination stems not merely from 
colonial rule, but also from the alien subjugation of any other type found its place 
in the Friendly relations declarations43. It envisages that every state has a duty to 
promote the realisation of the principle of equal rights and self-determination, and 
refers to colonialism and peoples subjected “<...> to alien subjugation, domination and 
exploitation constitutes a violation of the principle <...>” (paragraph 2). due to such 
a formulation it is obvious that the declaration distinguishes two categories: colonial 
peoples and peoples that are under “alien subjugation, domination and exploitation”. 
This understanding of rationae personae “<...> has now been widely accepted not only 
by individual groupings of States, but by the world community at large <...>”44. It was 
also supported by the united Nations International Law commission45.
When analysing the term “alien subjugation, domination and exploitation”, some 
academics, for instance, professor r. Higgins refer to the “<...> occupied territories 
upon the termination or suspension of military hostilities”46. professor a. cassese 
supports the approach in which peoples subjected to foreign occupation or domination 
have the right to external self-determination47. Others, for instance, dr. H. Quane48 or 
42  Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and 
Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro) (dissenting Opinion of judge ad hoc Kreca) [2007] Icj rep 43, 
p. 740.  
43 Higgins, r., supra note 24, p. 26.
44 cassese, a., supra note 27, p. 91‒92. Professor A Cassese quotes statements made by the United States 
and Brazil. 
45 In 1988, the International Law commission discussed the provision on colonialism of the “draft code 
of crimes against the peace and Security of Mankind”, all members of the commission agreed that 
self-determination did not only apply to colonial peoples but also to “peoples under alien subjugation”. 
according to the report of the International Law commission to the General assembly, “The principle 
of self-determination, proclaimed in the charter of the united Nations as a universal principle, had been 
applied mainly in eradicating colonialism, but there were other cases in which it had been and could and 
should be used. By not tying it exclusively to colonial contexts, it would be applied much more widely. In 
that connection, all members of the commission believed that the principle of self-determination was of 
universal application.” as quoted in cassese, a., op. cit., p. 92-93. 
46 Higgins, r., op. cit., p. 26.
47 See more in cassese, a., op. cit., p. 90-99.
48 Quane, H., a right to Self-determination for the Kosovo albanians?, supra note 21.
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professor L. Brimalmayer49 indicate that illegal annexation entitles to implement self-
determination and both refer to the illegal annexation of the Baltic States as an example. 
In the author’s opinion, notwithstanding the exact meaning of the term, attention 
should be drawn that in all of the above-mentioned cases the right to self-determination 
plays merely a subsidiary role50 and might be considered as “an appropriate remedy for 
prior illegal”51 actions. On the contrary, in colonial cases the right to self-determination 
plays a pivotal role and is considered to be the main legal ground for achieving “self-
government”. Peoples that are under other not colonial type of “alien subjugation, 
domination and exploitation” are entitled to invoke the right they were deprived of. 
In other words, the right to self-determination belonged to these peoples prior to the 
moment of occupation or other type of subjugation. This leads to the conclusion that 
peoples living under occupation or other type of subjugation are vested with the right 
of external self-determination, although they cannot be considered as a separate group 
of the holders of this right.  
In conclusion, the inhabitants of Trust and Non-Self-Governing territories are 
considered as “peoples”. In this regard, the entire population, not excepting various 
subgroups within the territory, has the right to self-determination, whereas the right 
is confined merely to the free choice of the territory’s external status. Peoples under 
other non-colonial type of subjugation cannot be regarded as a separate category of 
“peoples”, as they were entitled to the right of self-determination before the situation 
had appeared. 
2. The Entire Population of The State as “Peoples”
article 1 (2) of the united Nations charter envisages that one of the purposes of 
the united Nations is “[t]o develop friendly relations among nations based on respect 
for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples”52. In the particular 
articles the charter also refers to “states”53, which poses the question whether the terms 
“nations” and “states” differ from the term “peoples”. In 1951 H. Kelsen made an 
attempt to define “people” by equating the term “peoples“ with “states”54. He noted 
49 Brilmayer, L. Secession and Self-determination: One decade Later. Yale Journal of International Law, 
2000, 25, p. 283. 
50 For instance, the restoration of independence of the republic of Lithuania. 
51 Brilmayer, L., supra note 49, p. 284. See also the united Nations General assembly resolution on 
universal realization of the right of peoples to Self-determination (uN doc. a/res/41/100, of 4 
Dec. 1986. The paragraph 2 of the Resolution maintains that the General Assembly “[d]eclares its firm 
opposition to acts of foreign military intervention, aggression and occupation, since these have resulted 
in the suppression of the right of peoples to self-determination <…>” (emphasis added). paragraph 4 
states that the General assembly “[r]equests the commission on Human rights to continue to give special 
attention to the violation of human rights, especially the right to self-determination, resulting from foreign 
military intervention, aggression or occupation;” (emphasis added).
52 emphasis added.
53 For instance, article 1 (6), article 3, article 4, etc.
54 Kelsen, H. The Law of the United Nations: a Critical Analysis of its Fundamental Problems: with 
supplement. London: London Institute of World affairs, 1950, p. 52.
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that article 1 (2) of the united Nations charter referred to the relations among states55. 
as only states could possess equal rights in general international law, H. Kelsen 
concluded that the reference to “peoples” in the same provision denoted “states”56. 
However, travaux préparatoires to the charter reveal that this view is not sustainable57. 
during the debates at the united Nations conference a Belgian delegate expressed a 
concern over the use of the word “peoples” and submitted that the word “states” would 
be more appropriate58. The proposal was rejected by the drafting committee, which 
explained that the term “peoples” was a concept distinct from that of “state”, and the 
word “peoples” did not signify “states”. The committee explicitly declared that article 
1(2) was intended “to proclaim the equal rights of peoples as such“, and “[e]quality of 
rights”, it stated, “extends in the charter to states, nations and peoples”59. 
The above-mentioned interpretation was supported by the Secretariat of the united 
Nations. When asked for a justification of the use of “states“, “nations“, and “peoples“, 
it maintained that the word “state” indicated “<...> a definite political entity”60. The term 
“nation” was referred to in “<...> a broad and non political sense <...>”, so as “<...> 
to include colonies, mandates, protectorates and quasi-States as well as States61. The 
interpretation of “peoples” is even wider, for it reflects “<...> the idea of “all mankind” 
or “all human beings <...>”62. used in the formulation “self-determination of peoples”, 
the term is justified as a “<...> phrase [of] such common usage that no other word 
seems to be appropriate”. “Nations” are “<...> political entities, States and non-States, 
whereas “peoples” refers to groups of human beings who may or may not, comprise 
States or nations”63. 
The distinction between “peoples” and “states” was clearly reflected by the Human 
rights covenants and the Friendly relations declaration. The international documents 
declare that “all peoples” have the right to self-determination and “every state” has “the 
duty to respect this right”64 and to promote its realisation65. Therefore, “peoples” and 
“states” are separate notions. 
55 article 1(2) of the united Nations sets forth one of the purposes of the Organization: “To develop friendly 
relations among nations based on respect of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, 
and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace;”. 
56 Kelsen, H., supra note 54, p. 52.
57 Musgrave, T. d., supra note 7, p. 149.
58 duursma, j., supra note 17, p. 12.
59 Musgrave, T. d., op. cit. 
60 as quoted in duursma, j., op. cit.
61 Ibid.
62 Ibid., p. 13.
63 Ibid.
64 principle V of the Friendly relations declaration states that “[b]y virtue of the principle of equal rights 
and self-determination of peoples enshrined in the charter of the united Nations, all peoples have the 
right freely to determine, without external interference, their political status and to pursue their economic, 
social and cultural development, and every State has the duty to respect this right in accordance with the 
provisions of the charter.”
65 article 1(1) of the Human rights covenants states that “[a]ll peoples have the right to self-determination.” 
article 1(3) maintains that “[t]he State parties to the present covenant, including those having responsibility 
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as to the meaning of the term “nation”, several aspects must be emphasised. 
Firstly, it is clear that the term “nation” may have different meanings in international 
law. In the context of nationalism66, the “nation” is understood as a community bound 
together by blood-ties and characterised by a particular language, culture, religion and 
a set of customs67. Nationalism formed the scope of the holders of self-determination 
as peoples, which were defined by several attributes like history and language68. Thus, 
in this sense the term “nation” encompasses ethnic considerations and grouping of the 
population based on race, ethnicity, language and other similar criteria.
pursuant to the above-mentioned perception, the term “nation” has to be regarded 
as distinct from the term “peoples”. Otherwise it would lead to the negation of the self-
determination of long-existing national identities on academic grounds, for instance, 
the united States of america69. Of course, in case of ethnically homogeneous states 
the terms “peoples“ and “nation” coincide, although it happens quite rarely, because 
nowadays many states are ethnically heterogeneous70. 
On the other hand, the term “nation” may be understood as the population of a 
particular territory. In this context “peoples” “<...> actually refers to <...> the nation 
<...>” whereas “nationality” refers to the country in which a person is a citizen”.71 
professor r. Higgins supports this approach as she indicates that pursuant to the 
relevant documents and state practise “peoples“ “<...> is understood in the sense of all 
the peoples of a given territory. Of course, all members of distinct minority groups are 
part of the peoples of the territory. In that sense, they too, as individuals are the holders 
of the right of self-determination.”72 
for the administration of Non-Self-Governing and Trust Territories, shall promote the realization of the 
right of self-determination, and shall respect that right, in conformity with the provisions of the charter of 
the united Nations”. 
66 The concept of nationalism and its main idea “every nationality one State” led to the Spring of Nations 
and became the principle expression of rebellion against “artificial” multinational empires. Rai , d., supra 
note 7, p. 176.
67 Musgrave, T. d., supra note 7, p. 5.
68 Koeck, H. F.; Horn, d., supra note 20, p. 71.
69 professor I. Brownlie as quoted in Ghebrewebet, H. supra note 20, p. 124. professor I. Brownlie refers 
to the fact that the united States of america does not recognise the existence of ethnic groups and the 
national identity of americans is not based on ethnic criteria.
70 In the 1980’s some found only 15 of the world’s states are homogeneous nation states. See in Lee, S.; 
Moore, W., etc. Ethnicity and Repression: The Ethnic Composition of Countries and Human Right 
Violations [interactive]. 2002-10-02 [accessed on 2012-09-12]. < http://mailer.fsu.edu/~whmoore/garnet-
whmoore/research/Leeetal.pdf>. 
71 a. eide notes: “<…> from the perspective of international society, “nations” are understood in a territorial 
sense. International law presumes the existence of States which are already constituted and generally 
recognized. The criteria for statehood contained in the 1933 convention on the rights and duties of 
States article 1 are still generally held to be valid <…>. From the standpoint of international law, the 
“permanent population” is identical to the nation. “Nationality” refers to the country in which a person is 
a citizen. From an international law perspective, the nationality of a citizen of Belgium is simply Belgian, 
not Flemish [or] Wallonian <…>”. As quoted in Raič, d., supra note, p. 244-245.
72 Higgins, r. Problems & Process: International Law and How We Use It. Oxford : clarendon press, 1994, 
p. 124.
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The approach in which “peoples” means the entire population of the state is 
undoubtedly the least controversial as it excludes the possibility of external self-
determination for a subgroup within a state73. Therefore, only the “nation”, not 
subgroups, has a right to external74 as well as internal self-determination75. In this sense 
“peoples” can exercise both forms of self-determination without a threat against the 
territorial integrity of the state. 
The position towards territorially defined “peoples” is supported by the Friendly 
relations declaration which sets forth that states are conducting themselves in 
compliance with the right to self-determination if they possess “a government 
representing the whole people belonging to the territory”76 (principle V). The territorial 
application of self-determination is also evident from states’ reports submitted under 
article 40 of the International covenant on civil and political rights. It reveals that 
states consider the right to self-determination as a right for the entire population of the 
state77. The reports also confirm that the right to self-determination inter alia includes 
the internal dimension, as 79% of the states commented directly or indirectly on this 
particular aspect78. 
Furthermore, the approach in which “peoples” are considered as the inhabitants 
of the state was also followed by regional international documents and the judicial 
bodies. For instance, the Final act of the conference on Security and co-Operation in 
europe79 sets forth the right of peoples to self-determination (principle VIII). Not only 
does principle VIII refer to self-determination, but it also emphasises the territorial 
integrity of states80 which may suggest that self-determination must be exercised within 
73 For this reason the view that groups within states exercise the right to self-determination in conjunction 
with the entire population of the state was supported by Serbia during the proceedings related with the 
unilateral declaration of Independence of Kosovo at the International court of justice. Accordance with 
International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect (advisory Opinion) (Written 
Statement of Serbia) [interactive]. 2010-07-22 [accessed on 2012-09-01]. < http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/
files/141/15642.pdf>.
74 For instance, the dissolution of Czechoslovakia, the reunification of Germany, etc.
75 There are no constraints on the application of self-determination either externally or internally in case 
“peoples” are territorially defined, thus the internal dimension of self-determination will be briefly 
presented in the subsequent chapter of the article. 
76 Emphasis added. According to the cited provision, the theory in which “peoples” are territorially defined 
is named the representative theory of self-determination. See more about the theory in Musgrave, T. d., 
supra note 7, p. 151-154.
77 Quane, H., a right to Self-determination for the Kosovo albanians?, supra note 21, p. 221. The 
conclusion is based on a survey of the reports submitted by 97 states. Of the 97 states, 87 commented on 
self-determination. 
78 Ibid.
79 according to professor j. crawford, notwithstanding the fact that the document is not legally binding, it 
is significant as a statement of various views. Moreover, it had a considerable currency and influence in 
east-West diplomacy, and led the Organization of Security and cooperation in europe. See in crawford, 
j. supra note 19, p. 31. 
80 principle VIII sets forth that “[p]articipating States will respect the equal rights of peoples and their right 
to self-determination, acting at all times in conformity with the purposes and principles of  the charter 
of the united Nations and with the relevant norms of international law, including those relating to the 
territorial integrity of States”. 
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the territorial limits of the state. Yet, the traveaux préparatoires of the Final act reveal 
that the term “peoples” in principle VIII was intended to “<…> refer only to groups 
characterized by the fact of living in sovereign countries and identifying with the 
population of these countries”81. Furthermore, the Supreme court of canada, when 
analysing the meaning of the term “peoples” in the Quebec’s case, had no doubts that 
“peoples” might signify the “entirety of a state’s population” 82.
In conclusion, it is difficult to rebut that the entire population of the state is 
considered as “peoples” who may invoke the right to self-determination, including its 
internal and external dimensions. In this regard, the term “peoples” ignores ethnic, 
cultural and/or other differences between distinct groups within a state. all subgroups 
within a state may exercise self-determination in conjunction with the entire population. 
However, ethnic considerations may be relevant in case of homogeneous states wherein 
the inhabitants of the state can be defined by an ethnic criterion as “nation”, though for 
the time-being most of the states are heterogeneous and encompass one or more distinct 
subgroups.
3. Subgroups Within a State as “Peoples”
3.1. The Applicability of Self-Determination to Subgroups Within a State
as mentioned above, the applicability of the right to self-determination to the 
entire population of a state is considered to be the least controversial as in the case 
of external self-determination it would not impair the territorial integrity of a state. 
However, in this regard the right to self-determination fails to take into consideration 
the enormous impact of linguistic, cultural, religious or other related factors by which 
various subgroups identify themselves. In general these subgroups do not “<...> 
81 cassese, a., supra  note 27, p. 151.
82 Reference re Secession of Quebec, supra note 14, § 124. The court stated: “The right to self-determination 
has developed largely as a human right, and in generally used in documents that simultaneously contain 
references to “nation“ and „state“. The juxtaposition of these terms is indicative that the reference to 
“people” does not necessarily mean the entirety of a state‘s population.” 
 The Supreme court of canada was asked to deliver an opinion whether Quebec could legally leave 
canada by simply declaring independence. Secession would require the amendments of the constitution. 
However, if a clear majority of Quebecers opted for secession, the federal government and other provinces 
would have had a duty to negotiate. If negotiations failed, and Quebec declared independence unilaterally, 
the international community would have had to decide whether to recognise the independence of Quebec. 
Thus, the court had to evaluate not only the existing amendment procedures under the constitution of 
Canada, but also it had to answer whether Quebec enjoyed the right under international law to declare 
independence unilaterally. The court concluded that neither canadian constitution nor public international 
law afforded the province of Quebec the right to exercise external right to self-determination and to secede 
from canada unilaterally. Notwithstanding the fact that the opinion is not binding and it was rendered 
by the national court, it is important as the court analysed fundamental questions of international public 
law. Moreover, if the court had favoured unilateral secession of Quebec, this would have entailed legal 
consequences. 
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consider themselves as one “people” by virtue of the fact that they happen to reside 
within certain established territorial limits”83. 
Thus, limiting the right to self-determination to the colonial entities and the entire 
population of a state is conceivable, for it eliminates the possibility to subgroups 
to invoke external self-determination. In this sense, it is worth reminding that self-
determination does not include an absolute right to unilateral secession, i.e. external self-
determination. according to a certain approach, the right to external self-determination 
stems from a relevant provision of the Friendly relations declaration84. even if it is 
true, the right is confined to the fulfilment of certain conditions. Therefore, launching 
the analysis whether subgroups may constitute “peoples”, it is necessary to perceive 
the right to self-determination as encompassing the external, although not in the form 
of absolute unilateral secession, as well as the internal dimension. The exclusion of 
internal dimension from the concept of self-determination would lead to fallacious 
conclusions.   
The internal dimension of the right to self-determination was confirmed by including 
it in the Human Rights Covenants that refer to “all peoples” as the beneficiaries of 
the right (article 1 (1). The wording of their respective article 1 (1) “[a] people’s 
pursuit of its political, economic, social and cultural developments” means the right 
of peoples to participate in the decision-making processes. The decisions “<...> have 
not to be taken for a people but by the people”85. It also implies that self-determination 
“<...> is supposed to be materialized primarily by achieving internal self-determination 
– i.e. by establishing constitutional mechanisms that allow the entity <...> to pursue 
its political, economic, social and cultural development within the framework of 
the existing state <...>”86. pursuant to the key element of internal dimension of self-
determination – participation – the right has a continuous character and cannot be 
“consumed” once as in the case of external self-determination. The ongoing character 
of internal self-determination was reflected in the General Assembly’s resolution on the 
83 Musgrave, T. d., supra note 7, p. 153.
84 principle V of the Friendly relations declaration states that “[n]othing in the foregoing paragraphs shall 
be construed as authorizing or encouraging any action which would dismember or impair, totally or in 
part, the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent States conducting themselves 
in compliance with the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples as described above 
and thus possessed of a government representing the whole people belonging to the territory without 
distinction as to race, creed or colour.” (emphasis added). It is argued that according to the so-called 
“safeguard clause”, a people may exercise a right to external self-determination if a state lacks a 
representative government that acts in conformity with the right to self-determination as described in the 
declaration. See more, for instance, Seidel, G. a, supra note 3, p. 207; Ryngaert, C.; Griffioen, C., supra 
note 18, p. 579-585; Raič, d., supra note 7, p. 308-397.
85 Koeck, H. F.; Horn, d., supra note 20, p. 101.
86 Muharremi, r. Kosovo’s Declaration of Independence: Self-Determination and Sovereignty Revisited. 
Review of Central and East European Law. 2008, 33: 401-435, p. 414. The Supreme court of canada 
supported the position towards the internal self-determination as it stated that “[t]he recognized sources 
of international law establish that the right to self-determination of a people is normally fulfilled through 
internal self-determination – a people’s pursuit of its political, economic, social and cultural development 
within the framework of an existing state”. Reference re Secession of Quebec, supra note 14, § 126. 
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universal realization of the right of peoples to self-determination,87 which establishes 
that “<...> self-determination is a fundamental condition for the effective guarantee 
and observance of human rights and for the preservation and promotion of such rights”. 
The standpoint that self-determination serves as a safeguard for the effective realization 
of other human rights was reiterated by the Human rights committee in its General 
comment on article 1 of the covenant on civil and political rights88.  
One may argue that the ongoing character of self-determination “<...> is nothing 
else (and nothing more) than a right of all peoples organized as independent States to 
choose and to develop their political, social and economic structure according to their 
wishes and desires without outside, that is, third States interference”89. To some extent, 
professor j. crawford supports the approach in which the ongoing character is bound 
with the rule preventing interference in the internal affairs of a state, though he does not 
confine the right to self-determination to this perception. 90 Indeed, it is hard to accept 
that self-determination is, in essence, the right of states which coincides with the rule 
against intervention in the internal affairs of a state. In this sense, several aspects must 
be emphasised. 
First of all, the united Nations charter lays down the obligation to its members to act 
inter alia in accordance with the principles of sovereign equality and non-intervention 
into the matters which are within the domestic jurisdiction of states (Article 2 (1), (7). 
These principles ensure the possibility for states to act freely in their internal affairs, 
whereas self-determination has a different purpose and meaning. In addition, if self-
determination had meant only the rule against interference in the internal matters, a 
separate reference to it in the text of the charter would have been redundant. Moreover, 
it would be tenable to agree that “[o]ne should not easily assume that a principle, which 
has already received so much attention, also in legal texts, does not have independent 
meaning”91. 
Secondly, the principles of sovereign equality and non-intervention refer to states, 
whereas the right to self-determination pertains to “peoples”. as noted above, only 
“peoples”, not states, are the beneficiaries of the right. 
accordingly, it cannot be assumed that self-determination as a continuing right 
refers merely to the rule against intervention in the internal affairs of a state. Yet, it is 
true that internal self-determination means “<...> a right of a people to participate (a right 
87 uN doc. a/res/41/10, of 4 dec. 1986.
88 General comment 12, article 1, compilation of General comments and General recommendations 
adopted by Human rights Treaty Bodies, uN doc. HrI/GeN/1 rev.1 p. 12, 1994.
89 As quoted in Raič, d., supra note 7, p. 233.  
90 professor j. crawford maintains that “<...> to existing States, excluding for the purposes of self-
determination those parts of the State that are themselves self-determination units as defined. In this case 
the principle of self-determination normally takes the well-known form of the rule preventing intervention 
in the internal affairs of a State, a central element of which is the right of the people of the State to choose 
for themselves their own form of government. In this sense, at least, self-determination is continuing, 
and not a once-for-all right.” See in crawford, j. The Creation of States in International Law. Oxford: 
clarendon press, 2006, p. 126.
91 rosas, a. Internal Self-determination in Tomuschat, c. (ed.), supra note 21, p. 229.
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to have a say) in the decision‒making process of the State”92. The acknowledgement 
of this perception can be found in the respective provision of the Friendly relations 
declarations. It sets forth that states are conducting themselves in compliance with the 
principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples if they possess “a government 
representing the whole people belonging to the territory without distinction as to race, 
creed or colour.” (paragraph 7, principle V). 
The wording of the above provision also leads to the conclusion concerning the 
beneficiaries of the right to self-determination. It is asserted that the term “the whole 
people” means either that one state can have but one people, or that within a state more 
than one people may coexist93. The latter meaning therefore seems tenable if we read the 
term “the whole people” in conjunction with the words “as to race, creed or colour”. It 
is difficult to rebut that the prohibition on discrimination regarding race, creed or colour 
refers to the subgroups that exist within a state. The subgroups, in addition to the entire 
population of the State, also have a right to participate in the decision-making process 
of the State94. In other words, in cases where all the people, including distinct groups 
within the state, exercise the right to self-determination through the participation in the 
government of the state on a basis of equality, the territorial integrity of such a state is 
protected95. 
The applicability of self-determination to subgroups within independent states was 
upheld by the declaration on the rights of Indigenous peoples, adopted in 200796. 
article 3 of this declaration recognises the right to self-determination of indigenous 
peoples which means that they are enabled to free determination of political status 
and pursuit of their economic, social and cultural development97. However, article 4 
confines the right to self-determination to its internal implementation as it sets forth that 
“[i]ndigenous peoples, in exercising their right to self-determination, have the right to 
autonomy or self-government in matters relating to their internal and local affairs, as 
well as ways and means for financing their autonomous functions.” 
The indigenous peoples traditionally form sub-communities within a state, thus their 
entitlement to internal self-determination suggests that the concept “peoples” extends to 
subgroups. In this regard, the author shares the opinion that the term “peoples” “<...> is 
not the subject to a restrictive interpretation”98. Moreover, the declaration on the rights 
of Indigenous Peoples was adopted by the overwhelming majority that ascertains the 
opinio juris of states on the interpretation of “peoples”99.
92 Raič, d., supra note 7, p. 237.
93 duursma, j. Fragmentation and the international relations of micro-states: self-determination and 
statehood. cambridge: cambridge university press, 1996, p. 36. 
94 Raič, d., supra note 7, p. 247.
95 crawford, j., supra note 19, p. 57.
96 uN doc. a/res/61/295 of 13 Sep. 2007.
97 article 3 states: “Indigenous peoples have the right to self-determination. By virtue of that right they 
freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.”
98 jaber, T., supra note 25, p. 930.
99 Ibid. 
Jurisprudence. 2013, 20(1): 91–118. 107
Of course, one may argue that the opinio juris refers merely to the indigenous 
peoples though not to the other subgroups100. according to H. Quane, the emergence of 
the internal right to self-determination is confined to indigenous peoples, although still 
contentious for other groups101. In the author’s view, this approach cannot be sustained. 
First of all, the international documents refer to self-determination as pertaining 
to “all peoples” and not to one subgroup. Furthermore, the recognition merely of one 
subgroup ‒ indigenous peoples ‒ as the beneficiaries of the right to self-determination 
would be difficult to reconcile with the concept of representative government. No 
one could qualify a government which excludes all distinct subgroups, except one, 
from the use of the right to self-determination as being “representative”. It would be 
discriminatory towards various subgroups that exist within a state to assure the right 
only to indigenous peoples. 
Moreover, if we admit that self-determination concerns, among other aspects, 
the need to protect the identity of a subgroup and/or their fundamental rights and 
freedoms102, there is no objective justification for the entitlement of protection merely 
to one subgroup. 
Finally, the applicability of self-determination to various subgroups within a state 
has been confirmed by judicial bodies. In Katangese People’s Congress v. Zaire103 
the african commission on Human and people’s rights (hereinafter referred to as 
the ‘commission’) admitted that Katangese who formed one part of the inhabitants of 
Zaire might be qualified as a “people” for the purpose of the right to self-determination. 
The commission observed that “[t]he issue in the case is not self-determination for all 
Zaireans as a people, but specifically for the Katangese”104. However, it maintained that 
the right to self-determination is exercised primarily internally, whereas the absolute 
right to secede does not exist. The commission stated that “<...> self-determination 
may be exercised in any of the following ways: independence, self-government, local 
government, federalism, confederalism, unitarism or any other form of relations that 
accords with the wishes of the people but fully cognizant of other recognized principles 
such as sovereignty and territorial integrity”. as concerns Katangese, the commission 
added: “Katanga is obliged to exercise a variant of self-determination that is compatible 
with the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Zaire”, i.e. internally.
another example of application of self-determination to subgroups is Kevin 
Mgwanga Gunme et al v. Cameroon case. The commission established that “the people 
of Southern Cameroon” – part of the inhabitants of Cameroon ‒ can be referred to 
as a “people”. relying on its former decision regarding Katangese, the commission 
emphasised that secession as a form to exercise self-determination may be exercisable 
100 Quane, H. protection after Kosovo in Summers, j. (ed.), supra  note 21,  p. 191.
101 Ibid. 
102 See, for instance, report of the Working Group established in accordance with commission on Human 
rights resolution 1995/32, uN docs. e/cN.4/2001/85 p. 10, 12, 2001.
103 Katangese Peoplesʼ Congress v. Zaire, 75/92, of 16 dec. 1994. 
104 emphasis added.
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only under certain conditions, thus, “<...> the secession is not the sole avenue open to 
Southern cameroonians to exercise the right to self-determination”105. 
In its decision concerning Quebec, the Supreme Court of Canada exemplifies 
the same approach that was taken by the commission. The court acknowledged 
that subgroups within a state might be considered as the beneficiaries of the right to 
self-determination. It stated that “peoples” “<...> may include only a population of 
an existing state. The right to self-determination has developed largely as a human 
right, and is generally used in documents that simultaneously contain references to 
“nation” and “state”. The juxtaposition of these terms is indicative that the reference to 
“people” does not necessarily mean the entirety of a state’s population.”106 according 
to the Court, “[t]o restrict the definition of the term to the population of existing states 
would render the granting of a right to self-determination largely duplicative, given the 
parallel emphasis within the majority of the source documents on the need to protect 
the territorial integrity of existing states <...>”107. Lastly, it supported the approach 
in which self-determination was normally fulfilled through internal self-determination 
whereas a right to external self-determination, i.e. unilateral secession, arose only under 
certain circumstances108.
To sum up, it follows that the right to self-determination is applicable to subgroups 
within a state, thus they can be qualified as “peoples”. As compared to the inhabitants 
of Trust and Non-Self-Governing Territories, and/or the entire population of a state, the 
internal dimension of the right to self-determination must be emphasised, as subgroups 
are primarily entitled to exercise self-determination internally. It means the pursuit of 
subgroups’ political, economic, social and cultural development within the framework 
of an existing state. Not only relevant international documents, but also the practise of 
the judicial bodies reveals that subgroups are not entitled to an absolute right to external 
self-determination.
3.2. Defining subgroups as “peoples”
as it has been shown that international law supports the applicability of self-
determination towards subgroups within a state, the question of the characteristics of 
a subgroup needs to be addressed. It is a difficult task to decide on the features to be 
attributable to a particular subgroup that may invoke internal right to self-determination, 
as there has been no common agreement on it. 
Of course, one may argue that any effort to define “peoples” is fruitless since “<...> 
self-determination is so dependent on the individual and contingent facts of the cases 
that it can only be governed by a standard of reasonableness or appropriateness”109. On 
105 Kevin Mgwanga Gunme et al. v. Cameroon, supra note 13, § 191.
106 Reference re Secession of Quebec, supra note 14, § 124.
107 Ibid.
108 Ibid., § 126.
109 as quoted in Knop, K. Diversity and Self-Determination in International Law. cambridge: cambridge 
university press, 2002, p. 37.
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the other hand, “[e]ven if it would be true, it does not mean that the concept can have 
no place in international law”110. The author favours the latter approach, as the absence 
of clear definition has not prevented international bodies from applying the concept. 
Yet, it does not exempt states from the duty to respect and promote the right to self-
determination either. 
The term “subgroup” refers to a certain group of individuals. Obviously, not every 
group of individuals or aggregate of individuals qualifies as a group for the purpose of 
self-determination: an association of dentists is certainly a group, but not in the sense 
in which the term is used in this context111. as it has been correctly pointed out, “<...> 
one must presuppose the existence of a collectivity as a distinct entity with certain 
group characteristics, which are non-reducible to the characteristics of the composing 
individuals. reformulated with regard to the issue of group identity, this amounts to 
saying that the identity of the community has to go beyond the merely aggregated 
identities of the individual members”112. 
emphasis on a clear identity of a group is placed by a. cristescu, the Special 
rapporteur of the united Nations Sub-commission on prevention of discrimination113, 
whose position is based on various opinions of states expressed during the debates in 
the united Nations organs. He revealed three main elements that are attributable to 
a subgroup in order for it to qualify as “peoples”: a social entity possessing a clear 
identity and its own characteristics, a relationship with a territory and lastly, an entity 
should not be equated with ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities114. 
Therefore, the distinctiveness of a subgroup refers to the composition of both 
objective and subjective criteria that provide guidance for the determination of its 
identity115. As to the objective criteria, UNESCO International Meeting of Experts 
on Further Study of the concept of the rights of peoples (hereinafter referred to as 
‘uNeScO International Meeting of experts’) suggested that an entity should possess 
some or all of the following common features: common historical tradition; racial or 
ethnic identity; cultural homogeneity; linguistic unity; religious or ideological affinity; 
territorial connection; and common economic life. Moreover, the group must be of a 
certain number which need not be large (e.g. the people of micro-states) but which must 
be more than a mere association of individuals within a state116.  
110 Raič, d., supra note 7, p. 261.
111 Ibid., p. 260.
112 As quoted in Raič, d., ibid.
113 The Subcommission on the promotion and protection of Human rights was established by the commission 
on Human rights under the authority of economic and Social council resolution 9 (II) of 21 june 
1946. The name was changed from Subcommission on prevention of discrimination and protection of 
Minorities by ecOSOc decision 1999/256 of 27 july 1999. The work of the Subcommission is continued 
by the Human rights council advisory committee.
114 uN doc. e/cN.4/Sub.2/404/rev. 1, 1981, p. 41.
115 Raič, d., op. cit., p. 263.
116 uNeScO International Meeting of experts on Further Study of the rights of peoples, Final report and 
recommendations, uN doc. SHS-89/cONF.602/7, of 22 February 1990, p. 7-8. 
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One may argue that the identification of objective criteria is usually “context-
dependant”, as “<...> the term “objective” does not mean characteristics totally 
unchangeable and independent from decisions, opinions and changes voluntary 
undertaken by a “people” since “peoples” is not a static concept”117. To some extent, 
the author should agree with this approach, for it is hardly possible to determine various 
groups within states by uniform objective attributes, particularly in the heterogeneous 
societies prevalent for the time being. In this sense, professor H. Hannum reasonably 
points out that it is difficult “<...> to identify the common characteristics – apart from 
citizenship – of Swiss, Indians, Nigerians, Guatemalans, and americans, yet each of 
these groups is identified by the international community as a “people”118. 
On the other hand, the author maintains that the description “context-dependant” 
should not be applied to the criterion of territorial connection which is most often 
considered as a necessary condition for “peoplehood”119. It is argued that the criterion 
implies that a group of people constitutes the majority on that particular territory120. 
The existence of the majority is necessary in order to be capable to form a new 
state121. as noted above, self-determination does not involve an absolute right to an 
independent statehood, thus, the author does not link territorial connection with the 
attributes of a future state. It seems reasonable to consider that the relationship with 
a territory is essential for the expression of the identity of a subgroup122. The link to 
a defined territory not only creates conditions to cultivate, preserve and develop the 
specific characteristics of a subgroup123, but entitles it to determine its political destiny 
in a democratic fashion124. Moreover, the territorial connection differentiates “peoples” 
from a minority as for minorities no territorial relationship is demanded125. 
As to the subjective criteria, UNESCO International Meeting of Experts has stated 
that an entity “<...> as a whole must have the will to be identified as a people or to be 
conscious of being a people <...>; and possibly <...> must have institutions or other 
117 As quoted in Raič, d., supra note 7, p. 263.
118 Hannum, H. rethinking Self-determination. Virginia Journal of International Law. 34 (1): 1-69, 1993, 
p. 34 (1): 1-69, 1993, p. 36.
119 Ibid., p. 263-264.
120 Murswiek, d. The Issue of a right of Secession – reconsidered in Tomuschat, c. (ed.), supra note 21, 
p. 27; Raič, D., op. cit., p. 262. However, it is difficult to give an indication of what constitutes a clear 
majority. Some assert that as the risk of creating a large minority in the newly established State must be 
brought to a minimum, a majority of at least 80 per cent would be required. The Kosovo Albanians, e.g., 
constitute 90 per cent of the population of Kosovo. See ryngaert, c.; Sobrie S., supra note 19, p. 577.
121 Murswiek, d., supra note 120, p. 37. C. Ryngaert and S. Sobrie maintain that “[i]t is difficult to give 
an indication of what constitutes a clear majority. As the risk of creating a large minority in the newly 
established State must be brought to a minimum, a majority of at least 80 per cent would be required. The 
Kosovo albanians, e.g., constitute 90 per cent of the population of Kosovo.” in ryngaert, c.; Sobrie S., 
supra note 18, p. 577.
122 Those subgroups which consider themselves to be entitled to self-determination usually inhabit a distinct 
territorial unit. For instance, Kosovo albanians, Flemish in Belgium, the Inuit in Kanada, etc.
123 Murswiek, d., op. cit. , p. 27.
124 Scharf, M. p. earned Sovereignty: juridical underpinnings. Denver Journal of International Law. 2004 
31(3): 373-387, p. 379.
125 See chapter 3.3. of this article.
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means of expressing its  will of identity”126. In other words, the subjective criteria 
refer to the so-called collective individuality which “<…> reflects the “selfness” of 
a collectivity as a result of which this “self” would be distinguishable from any other 
“self” on the globe”127.  
The subjective criteria seem to prevail over the objective ones. This approach was 
taken by the african commission on Human and peoples’ rights. analysing whether 
“the people of Southern cameroon” qualify as “peoples”, the commission maintained 
that Southern Cameroonians manifest numerous characteristics and affinities, though 
“[m]ore importantly they identify themselves as a people with a separate and distinct 
identity”128. The International commission of jurists even asserts that “<…> a people 
begin to exist only when it becomes conscious of its own identity and asserts its will to 
exist <...>”129. Therefore, it seems tenable to argue that the subjective criteria are crucial 
in distinguishing “peoples” from other groups and communities, including minorities, 
as they do not possess a group identity130. The differences between “peoples” and 
minorities will be discussed in the subsequent chapter of this article. 
The african commission on Human and peoples’ rights relied on the criteria 
elaborated by uNeScO International Meeting of experts. In Kevin Mgwanga Gunme 
et al. v. cameroon case the respondent state – cameroon – claimed that “<...> no ethno-
anthropological argument can be put forward to determine the existence of a people 
of Southern cameroons, the Southern part being of the large Sawa cultural area, the 
northern part being part of the Grass fields’ cultural area. Since 1961, although some 
specificities had been preserved on more than one aspect, there had been remarkable 
rapprochement at the administrative and legal levels. The “separate and distinct 
people” thesis is no longer valid today”131. In other words, cameroon maintained that 
the qualification of “peoples” must be based merely on the objective criteria related 
with ethnic or anthropological characteristics of a group. It denied that specificities 
stemming from different legal, educational, cultural systems or historical tradition may 
be applied in order to determine “peoples”. although the commission agreed with 
the position that peoples “may manifest ethno-anthropological attributes”, it did not 
concur with the opinion that ethnic or anthropological attributes were obligatory in 
order to invoke self-determination. The commission referred to uNeScO International 
Meeting of experts which has stated that a “people” needs to manifest some or all of the 
objective criteria. Ethno-anthropological attributes may be added to the characteristics 
of a “people”, though they cannot be used as the only dominant factor to accord or deny 
the enjoyment or protection of people’s rights132. as noted above, the commission 
126 emphasis added. uNeScO International Meeting of experts on Further Study of the rights of peoples, 
Final report and recommendations, supra note 116, p. 8. 
127 Raič, d., supra note 7, p. 266.
128 Kevin Mgwanga Gunme et al  v. Cameroon, supra note 10, § 179.
129 International commission of jurists. The Events in East Pakistan, 1971: A Legal Study. Geneva, 1972, 
p. 49.
130 Raič, d., op. cit. 
131 Kevin Mgwanga Gunme et al  v. Cameroon, supra note 10, § 168. 
132 Ibid., § 178.
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paid special attention to the subjective criteria for it maintained that “[i]dentity is an 
innate characteristic within a people. It is up to the external people to recognise such 
existence, but not to deny it”133. 
To sum up, a two-way test is applied in order to determine whether a group qualifies 
as “peoples”. First, the test looks whether a group of individuals can be distinguished 
from other groups by one or all objective criteria, particularly ethnic or racial identity, 
common historical traditions, culture, language, religious or ideological affinities, 
common economic life. Moreover, a group must have a territorial connection with a 
particular territory. Second, the test examines “the extent to which individuals within 
the group self-consciously perceive themselves collectively as a distinct “people”134. If 
a subgroup satisfies the necessary criteria, it can legitimately invoke the internal right 
to self-determination. 
3.3. The relationship between minority and “peoples”
The relevant international documents indicate that “peoples”, not minorities, have 
the right to self-determination. Minorities benefit from the minority rights envisaged 
in article 27 of the covenant on civil and political rights. It enunciates that persons 
belonging to ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities within a state shall not be denied 
the right, in community with other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, 
to profess and practise their own religion, or to use their own language. With regard 
to the covenant and other international documents it seems reasonable to assert that 
“<...> self-determination and minority rights are two distinct rights, with different 
beneficiaries”135. 
On the other hand, it is hard to deny that a minority can be described by the 
same objective characteristics as “peoples”. In the study regarding minorities, 
Francesco capotorti, the Special rapporteur of the Sub-commission on prevention of 
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, points out that there are several objective 
characteristics attributable to minorities. First, a group must possess ethnic, religious 
or linguistic features which enable to distinguish a group from those of the rest of 
the population136. Further, a group should be numerically inferior to the rest of the 
population137. The analysis of the relevant international documents, practise of judicial 
bodies and states support the enumerated objective criteria, though adds that a group 
may also possess cultural diversities138. Therefore, drawing a strict distinction between 
“peoples” and minorities seems to be extremely difficult. It is even noted that “[i]f 
133 Kevin Mgwanga Gunme et al  v. Cameroon, supra note 10, § 179.
134 Scharf, M. p., supra note 124, p. 380.
135 Higgins, r., supra note 24, p. 30.
136 uN doc. e/cN.4/Sub.2/384/add.5, 1977, p. 5.
137 Ibid.
138 See, for instance, Račkauskaitė-Burneikienė, A., Tautinėms mažumoms priklausančios kalbinės 
garantijos: tarptautinių standartų įgyvendinimas Lietuvos Respublikoje. [Linguistic Guarantees of the 
National Minorities: the Implementation of International Standards in the republic of Lithuania]. daktaro 
disertacija. Socialiniai mokslai (teisė). Vilnius: Mykolo Romerio Universitetas, 2012, p. 18-74. 
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a minority is simply considered to be an ethnic, linguistic, or religious group that is 
numerically inferior to the remainder of the population of a state, then such a distinction 
would debar virtually all subgroups within independent states from claiming a right to 
self-determination”139.
However, as in the definition of a minority no connection with a territory is 
required, it would distinguish “peoples” from other subgroups, including minorities. 
as to the links of minorities with a particular territory, the Human rights committee 
in its General comment on article 27 of the covenant on civil and political rights 
explained that the only link with the territory that is required is the fact of “existence”. 
The committee maintained that “<...> it is not relevant to determine the degree of 
permanence that the term “exist” connotes. Those rights simply mean that individuals 
belonging to those minorities should not be denied the right, in community with 
members of their group <...>. just as they need not be nationals or citizens, they need 
not be permanent residents. Thus, migrant workers or even visitors in a State party 
constituting such minorities are entitled not to be denied the exercise of those rights. 
<...>”140. The position allows drawing the conclusion that there can be minorities which 
are well-established in a territory of a state, although no particular links are required. 
Of course, minority groups may live in a territory of a state for a long time. Thus, 
“[t]he longer a minority is established in a given territory, the more chance there is 
that it will develop a particular attachment to the territory”141. For instance, Kosovo 
albanians, who are generally considered as an ethnic minority in Serbia, lived in the 
territory which we know today as Kosovo for ages and their relationship with the 
territory cannot be denied142. If the relationship with a particular territory exists, a 
minority could constitute “peoples”. 
The approach in which the territorial relationship plays a pivotal role in distinguishing 
the “peoples” and minorities is also supported in the doctrine. For instance, professor j. 
crawford states that “<…> although distinctions are sometimes drawn on the basis of 
classes or categories of groups (e.g. national, ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities, 
indigenous populations, etc.), these distinctions are imprecise at best. a more useful 
distinction is that between the people of the state as a whole, more or less dispersed 
minorities which are in some way distinctive in terms of ethnicity, language or belief, 
and “concentrated” minorities forming a distinctive unit in a particular area of a state 
and constituting a substantial majority of the population in that area”143. 
It should be highlighted that the attachment to a specific territory cannot be 
sufficient in order to qualify a certain group as “peoples”. According to a certain 
139 jaber, T., supra note 25, p. 933. 
140 General comment 23, article 27, compilation of General comments and General recommendations 
adopted by Human rights Treaty Bodies, uN doc. HrI/GeN/1 rev.1, 1994, p. 40.
141 duursma, j., supra note 17, p. 50.
142 ethnic albanians claim that their ancestors, the Illirian tribe of dardanians, settled in Kosovo as long as 
4 000 years ago. See, for instance, Weller, M. Contested Statehood Kosovoʼs Struggle For Independence. 
Oxford; New York: Oxford university press, 2009, p. 26.
143 crawford, j., supra note 19, p. 64.
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approach, despite the fact that the chinese minority population in New York have been 
living in a particular district for decades, it would not be reasonable to consider their 
claims for self-determination144. Therefore, it seems tenable to agree with the opinion 
that not only a mere fact of territorial connection must be taken into consideration, but 
the length of the connection plays a significant role145. 
In addition to the territorial relationship as a distinctive objective criterion, 
emphasis should be placed on the subjective criteria. Thus, the other crucial criterion is 
“<…> formed by the characteristic of a collective individuality of a people”146. It does 
not mean that minorities do not possess a group identity. They certainly do, although 
this identity is defined “<...> as a will of the group in question to preserve its own 
characteristics”147. In other words, minorities identify themselves as minorities in order 
to gain certain rights flowing from a minority status. 
as compared to “peoples”, minorities do not have a collective individuality 
because they “<…> cannot (apart from geographic factor) and, indeed, do not wish to 
be distinguished from their kith and kin residing in the kin State”148. Nevertheless, if a 
minority has a “collective individuality” – an identity by which it can be distinguished 
from those living in the “kin State” – it can be regarded as a “minority-people”149. The 
members of a “minority-people” not only enjoy minority rights, but may legitimately 
invoke the right to self-determination. In this respect, the definitions “minorities” and 
“peoples” overlap.
To sum up, minorities maintaining a well-established relationship with a particular 
territory and possessing collective individuality can be considered as “peoples”.  
Conclusions
1. The inhabitants of Trust and Non-Self-Governing Territories are considered 
as “peoples” in a strict legal sense and for legal purposes. In this regard “peoples” 
are able to exercise external self-determination which can be effectuated through 
creation of an independent state, association with an independent state or integration 
with an independent state. although the internal dimension of self-determination was 
completely disregarded in the context of decolonization, its existence has not been 
denied. In particular that the right to self-determination, including its beneficiaries, is 
not confined to colonial situations.
2. The entitlement to the right of self-determination does not stem solely from 
colonial rule, but also from the alien subjugation of any other type. However, peoples 
that are under any other type of alien subjugation, including occupation or annexation, 
144 jaber, T., supra note 25, p. 933.
145 Ibid. 
146 Raič, d., supra note 7, p. 266.
147 uN doc. e/cN.4/Sub.2/384/add.5, 1977, p. 6.
148 Raič, D., op. cit.
149 Ryngaert, C.; Griffioen, C., supra note 18, p. 578.
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cannot be regarded as a separate group of “peoples” as they had been vested with the 
right before the situation had emerged. Therefore, in this respect the application of 
external self-determination serves merely as a remedy for regaining the deprived right.
3. The entire population of a state is considered as “peoples” who may exercise 
the right to self-determination either internally or externally. In this sense the term 
“peoples” ignores ethnic, cultural, religious, linguistic and/or other differences among 
distinct groups within a state. all subgroups are entitled to exercise the right to self-
determination in conjuncture with the entire population. Although for the time being 
most of the states are comprised of various diverse subgroups, there on occasion might 
be states comprising one group. The inhabitants of the group can be defined by an 
ethnic criterion as “nation”. In this sense “nation” can be regarded as “peoples”. 
4. The subgroups that possess the relevant objective and subjective criteria can 
be qualified as “peoples” for the purpose of the right to self-determination. A well-
established relationship with a particular territory and the collective individuality of a 
subgroup are considered as necessary prerequisites for “peoplehood”. The entitlement 
to the right of self-determination does not per se signify the right to unilateral secession, 
thus self-determination primarily can be exercised internally. The subgroups pursue 
political, economic, social and cultural development within the framework of the 
existing state.  
5. The terms “minorities” and “peoples” can overlap. If a minority maintains a well-
established relationship with a particular territory and possesses collective individuality 
as a group, it qualifies as “peoples” or a “minority-people”. In addition to minority 
rights, it can enjoy the right to internal self-determination. 
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„PEOPLES“ SĄVOKA TARPTAUTINĖJE VIEŠOJOJE TEISĖJE
Lina Laurinavičiūtė
Mykolo romerio universitetas, Lietuva
Santrauka. Straipsnio tikslas yra atskleisti ir išanalizuoti apsisprendimo teisės taiky-
mo rationae personae (subjektų) aspektą tarptautinėje viešojoje teisėje. Apsisprendimo teisę 
įtvirtinanti 1945 m. Jungtinių Tautų Chartija, kitos tarptautinės teisės sutartys bei doku-
mentai nustato, kad ši teisė priklauso „peoples“, tačiau nė vienas iš dokumentų nepateikia 
termino apibrėžties. Vis dėlto tarptautinių dokumentų, valstybių bei teismų praktikos ana-
lizė rodo, kad apsisprendimo teisės subjektais vienareikšmiškai galima laikyti globojamų ir 
nesavavaldžių teritorijų gyventojus bei visus atitinkamos valstybės teritorijoje gyvenančius 
asmenis. Analizė paneigia kai kurių autorių nuomonę, jog apsisprendimo teisė priklauso tik 
globojamų ir nesavavaldžių teritorijų gyventojams.
Tarptautinės viešosios teisės doktrinoje nėra vienareikšmiškai sutariama dėl to, ar ap-
sisprendimo teisės subjektu galima laikyti valstybės teritorijoje gyvenančių žmonių grupę. 
Tarptautinės teisės dokumentų, teismų ir kitų institucijų praktikos analizė atskleidžia, kad 
žmonių grupė, iš kitų išsiskirianti objektyviaisiais bei subjektyviais bruožais, gali būti laiko-
ma „peoples“, t. y. apsisprendimo teisės subjektu. Ši žmonių grupė gali sutapti su mažuma, 
jeigu mažumai būdingi atitinkami objektyvūs ir subjektyvūs bruožai.
Pažymėtina, kad apsisprendimo teisės priklausymas tam tikrai žmonių grupei per se 
nereiškia, jog ši grupė turi teisę į vienašalę sececiją. Šiuo atveju pirmiausiai įgyvendinamas 
„vidinis“ apsisprendimas, t. y. valstybės viduje, sprendžiant dėl politinio, socialinio, ekono-
minio, kultūrinio grupės vystymosi. Tuo tarpu globojamų ir nesavavaldžių teritorijų gyven-
tojai apsisprendimo teisę įgyvendino tik „išoriškai“, t. y. įkurdami nepriklausomą valstybę, 
prisijungdami ar susijungdami su jau esančia valstybe. „Vidinis“ apsisprendimo teisės aspek-
tas dekolonizacijos proceso metu buvo „ignoruojamas“. Tuo atveju, kai apsisprendimo teisę 
įgyvendina visi valstybės teritorijoje gyvenantys asmenys, jie gali įgyvendinti abu šios teisės 
aspektus ‒ tiek „vidinį“, tiek „išorinį“.
Reikšminiai žodžiai: apsisprendimas, apsisprendimo teisės subjektas, mažumos, glo-
bojamos teritorijos, nesavavaldžios teritorijos, okupuotų teritorijų gyventojai, subgrupės vals-
tybėje.
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